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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE 
STATE OF-- UTAH 
a ('orporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
'I'H~~ STAT~~ TAX CO~.LM INN ION 
OF UTAH, 
f)ejendant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
C'a~e No. 
7236 
ThP ha~ie fact~ are largely ~tipulated (R. 10-17) 
and not in dispntP (R. 187). 
a. The Sale of Geneva. 
By the original of ~~xhihit B herein ( R. 21-:12) dated 
.Tune 19, 1946, the Oovernment of the United States sold 
to plaintiff, Geneva ~teel Company, a who'lly owned suh-
~idiary of United State~ Steel Corporation, Hw ''O('n('va 
Steel Plant.'' 1'he Clovernment had eon~trueted and op-
l 
erated thi:,; integ-rated steel plant in Utah in eonnection 
with World War IT. (Stip, par. 7 to 12, R. 11-12.) As the 
purchase price plaintiff paid the 'l'reasurer of the United 
States $40,000,000.00, the lump sum consideration for the 
eonveyanee to it of the "Geneva Sh~el Plant." (.F~x. B, 
H. 21-32, and Stip. Par. 5, 12 and 14, R. 11-12.) 
In addition, plaintiff bonght from tlw Government 
eertain "Inventories" for an additional and separate 
purchase price. 'l'his price was based upon unit prices 
applied to the inventories actual'ly on hand as of the ef-
fective datt' ol' ;,;ale, midnight .f une 18, 194G; was finally 
eompute(1 to be $7,175,:34-G.OO; and was likewise paid to 
the 'rreasnrer of tflP United States. (F~x. B, R. 21-32 and 
Stip. par. G, 12 and 14, R. 11-12.) 
Tn construeting, operating and so disposing of both 
the ''OPnPva Stet>! Plant" and the "Inventories", the 
F'edNal Oovpt·nrPent functioned through the Rceonstrnc-
ti.on F'inancP Corporation, a wholly owned government 
instrumentality. (Stip. par. :3, 7, R, 9 and 10, R. 10-12.) 
Howcwr, in (·onnedion with Hte over-all disposal of its 
entire Vlar Plant Congn•sf.: n~quired RP('Onstruetion Fi-
nancp Corporation (as it did all other government 
agene!e~; d1:o:posinp: of war surplus property) to utilize 
the over-a11 selling· and po!iey-making services of the 
\Var Assets Admilli''trator. who \Yas a federal attorney-
in-fad l"or 'hat :mrposp. (Stip. pnr. 4, 2:1 and 24, R. 10-
Fi.) 
Tltt> hn~:ie <"Olltra(·L ()I' sal<' for · • O<~rH~va" and th<~ 
"lnvcn\orit's," l!;xl!ihit B, stah•s that "Heeonstruetion 
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Finance Corporation" was "~<~ller" acting- "h.v and 
throug-h" tile "\Var Assds Administrator." (~tip., R 
21-32.) Likewi::-;(~ read tlw suhsequen t inshumcn ts of 
conveyance executed and dnlivered al'tm· the !'act of tlw 
sale and in performance of' this eontnwt. (8tip. par. 
18 and 20, and :b~x. C, D, 1~, F and G ; R. :):l-1 mJ.) U en eva 
Steel Company was in possession of the plant hoth 
before and after tlw sale, first as operator for tliP Gov-
ernment and after .June 18, 1~)4() as the owrwr. (Stip. 
par. 8, ~)and 12, R. 12.) 
ln effecting the sale, both lt. F.C. and the War Assf~!:s 
Administrator operated through their Washington main 
offices. ( Stip. par. 25b, R. lG, 32.) Geneva Steel Com-
pany is a Dc'laware corporation, wiih its principal place 
of operations in Utah. It executed the contract of sale in 
Utah (R 32), while Unit<~d StatPs Nteel Corporation 
guaranteed plaintil'f's perfonnane.e of the contract. (Stip. 
F~x. B, H. 32.) 
Neither the Federal Government nor R.F.C. and 
W.A.A., its two instrumentalities here concemed, is li-
censed or registered as a retailer under the Utah sales 
and use tax system. (Stip. par. 24b and 2Gb, R. 15-1G.) 
Nor did they mention or pretend to collect any additional 
sum from plaintiff denominated or in the nature of a 
sales or use tax. '1_1his was so both as to the" Tnventori0s'' 
--admittedly tangible personal prop<>rty-as well as 
with respPd to snel1 c·omponents of HlP "Oeneva fitet>l 
Plant" whieh might he elassified as "tangible personal 
property," as distingui::;hed from the Janel, water rights, 
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good will and other tang-ibh~ or intangible assets together 
eonstitnting the integmt<~d steel plant. ( Stip, par. 21, 
R 14.) 
rrhe lump sum pnec for "Geneva" as an ''inte-
grated steel plant" was at no time prior to the sale 
broken down into eomponent item~;, either as between 
real or personal property, tangibles and intangibles, 
or as between its four principal physical loeations in 
Utah at O(meva, and near Columbia, Payson and Cedar 
City. (Stip. par. 15, R 12 and J;}x. B, R. 21-:14.) As 
appears from J;}xhihit A lwn•in (R 19-20) (amplified in 
the Congressional Heport on thp sale of Geneva) the 
price for "Geneva" had no relationship to either cost 
or inventory val uP; tlw price was based upon the pro-
<luetive eapaeit~T of this integrated steel plant related 
to such fadon; as potential post-war demands for its 
product, potential mn rkds and their location, frl~ight 
rntPs, opprating ('OSts uncl ('OlllfWtitiVP prif'eS. 
b. The Defken,:y Assessment by Defendant. 
In its administration of the Usc and Sales 'fax Acts 
since H)i1:1, the defendant State Tax Commission of Utah 
has consistently and until now without exception con-
strued as exempt snell items of tangible pen;onal prop-
erty as might he included in a bona fide sale of an in-
t\:~grated property unit, as distinguished from inventories. 
A list of f'Xarnph~s of such sah~s eonstitutcs Exhibit H 
( R. 1 1 1). '!'he salP of personal property constituting a 
part of an opNating unit similar to Geneva except for 
size has not been considered taxable whether the seller 
transferring ownership of such an integrated property 
unit was selling one or several units; or to one or several 
purchasers; or incidentally invoked the services of a 
sales agent to aRsiHt in the disposaL ( I~x. H, R. 111.) 
No exceptions have been made in this policy except 
for this instance and the assertion at the hearing before 
the Commission (R. 197) and in P. (i of its decision (R. 
213) that it was now intending to proceed against other 
buyers of integrated businesses from W.A.A. or R.F.C. 
Twenty months after the date of sale, on February 
2G, 1948, the defendant Commission first levied a de-
ficiency Use Tax against plaintiff. 'l'his deficiency as-
sessment is two-fold: it consists of a tax based upon the 
purchase price of that portion of the "Inventories" 
which are not presently agreed by the Commission to be 
exempt for reasons not here involved; and. a tax based 
upon that portion of the ''Geneva Steel Plant," as dis-
tinguished from the ''I nvc•ntories," which the Commis-
sion has determined to he tangible personal property. 
Also included is an interest item for $:-l7,97G.69 to March 
G, 1948. (Stip. par. 22, R. 14, and R. 1-6.) 
Since the I urn p surn purchase price for the "Geneva 
Steel Plant" has not been broken down to "tangible per-
sonal property," the Commission used an allocation 
whieh plaintiff' had made on Dec•Pmher 12, 1 94G when 
it determinf'd how much of the $40,000,000.00 was to be 
eonsiden~d real property for the sole purposf' of affix-
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ll11-': t!Jp I'PYPll\l(• c:!:Wql:' n•:ptirPd h.\· ;!Jp tPI'lll:-' of J'c•d-
PraJ statutP:,.:. (:--\tip. par. l:J and J~J. H. 1~, 1:-l.) 
l t has not been thP pol iey of the Ji'edP raJ Oove nl-
uwnt in tlw case of hnlk sa!(~S or lhP sales of integrat<>d 
lmsines·:ps to eol'lP<~i. t'ron1 purehas<~rs any a<lditional 
it<•m ill iir·:t ni' o;· tll":(l!:lin:!~(·,l ;1 :::ll<·>~ or llSP Li~. U~tip. 
p:: r. :~:\ ft. 1 :l, 1 1;. l !~:d \diPt'<· i I !Jn:~ :'old ;:!P<·ping hag·s, 
<•lpciri(' mn;o;·s. ,jP<'p:-: 'il ,:il·J:i:ll' il<'l:L~. the ~''c·dPral (:oY-
PrnHtPnt :-:·('11PI ;} 1l:,T l1t1 ~'r:,U(•c1Pd i'rnllr p11rf·h~1S(·r~~ nn addi--
tionnl pun·f•ntn:~·(• d lh<· pur('lw~.;p priee whieh it has <le-
nominai<•:i a ''::a:Ps 1a :'': ;1n.l t.his addiiional sum tlw 
C()Vf'lTJlilr·ni ] n'llli:tt~d io v~il·io;•c; :-;tntp and loea·] tax-
in~.· ;ndlHll'ili<·:->. u·;tip. Jl<ll'. ~h <llld ~(ia, IL J:l, lfi.) 
Tim;; hoth lt.: '.( '. and \\'.~\."\. liaV<' <~oll<•d(•d snell 
'·~alP~ tnx" in Utah Bnt n1:itlJ<'l' li:1~ IH'<'H liePmwd a~ a 
··rntai[pr'' undPr ll<> lltgh law, and lwth rPLu~;e to uge 
.-;a](•:-: tax tokPn:-> or 1., ilH-· tlw ~WllP• lie rPport l'onlls n·-
qnii'(•d by th(' Comn•i,:,.:ion to lw :11Ihn1itted h~· iicen~ed 
rdailPr,:. ( Htip. par. ~)!],and 2£ih, it 1 ;l, I !i.) rl'hu T1'ederal 
'io\'ermnPnt hr:; nmdP i:: clear 1hai it has eollPf'iPd ~nell 
arlditional ite>n1s- -ilo1 !weausr· of any manddP of statP 
-tatuh~s. for it dt•nipc; :-;neb :-;tat<' powpr---hut as a matter 
ol' :ln!i1·:·. (l1;x_ .1. it 114.) ThP l<'ed(•nrl l;ovpmment has, 
ho'vVP\'('l', dic;d.q:-;ed lo '"·'eh ''latP and loeal taxing a,!.;PIH'i<'s, 
ineluding the 1Ttail Cr;Jill!tission in thi~ rasP, information 
witl1 n·~rwet to 1!11' -;:d1•-; ol' inh·.~~rah•d lmsinPS~i':-> ii·];c•r;o 
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no ~uel1 '• ~alt>~ tax'' wa~ eoll~~dvd from the pureha1-lers as 
a eondition of the ~alP. (~tip. par. :2:Ja, H. W.) 
On the ba::;is of the foreg-oin;_; !'aeb which are either 
1-'tipulated nr beyond di::;putP, the l'ornmission rejeeted 
plaintiff's :rwtition for a reddEc•rmination August 19, 
Hl48 (R. 214). Plaintiff undPr ~ee. 80-16-12, U.C.A. 
HJ4:i, now sePks from thi::; tribunal relief from the Use 
Tax chdieien<·.v a::;s<•ssnwnt whieh it elaims is improper, 
having- filed thP bond requirPd bY ~ec. z;:0-16-1:~. 
H. 
STATVTES JNVOLVKD 
In I !l:t) IT tah, together with man.\· other ::;tates, en-
aeted an '' ~~~mergenc.\· Sale!' '!'ax Aet.'' 'rhis law was 
complementPd in Hl37 hy the UsP Tax to fill in the inter-
stat<' eon1merep loopholes of thr' ha::;ie sales tax, particu-
larly with respeet to prior a<lver::;p discrimination agaim;t 
l 1tnh llln<'IIant~;. t '!'ax ( 'mmnisc;i(ln Third Biennial Ht>-
port 1 !l;J;)_;~(i, p. ~)4.) 
'l'h(• t\vo taxing ::;tatutel-i are "<·orrelative and comple-
mentar~'" and tlw "legit-ilatnrf'-ereatC'd 2peeific exemp-
tion:,; from the' :,;;:t]ps tax are al:,;o to hP trPatPd as ex-
<'lllption:-: frolll the 118\' t:1x. '' Union Portland Cement Co. 
v. f:'blt<' Tax ('o!nJniRsion of lT;ah (on n•hp;u·in;.~). 17ii P. 
2d R7~1. 
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Since the scope of eoverage of these acts IS here 
involved, all seetiom; deemed directly eoncerned are set 
forth in full, together with rcfprenees to other pertinent 
sections having generally to do with the taxing scheme 
\\~hieh an• too length:· to ht> quotPd. All italies are mus. 
The title to tltP Sales Tax Act, Chapter 6:1, Laws 
of Utah 19i3;) and now Chapter 13, 'l'itle 80, of the Utah 
Code, statPR that the> aet \Vas to impose ''a tax upon the 
retail purchases of <·ertain cnmi:!.odities, admissions anrl 
serviee~:.'' 'l'lle tax Is im~w~:Pd by Seetion R0-15-4 upon 
"every n'tail sale of bmiJ:ihle personal property mad1P 
1rithin th.o ,'-,'fate of ( 1tali. ·' 
Sur·tion ~0-1f'l-2(P) dPiinPs tltP tPrtlts "rd~lilPr'' and 
"retail sal<>" a~: rollows: 
(e) The term '· reb<iler ·' mPans a pers011 
<1oing- n. rc;nd:.".rh· o•·r'ani:wd n~tai·J business in 
tangih!p perso1wJ prope;:ty, known to the public 
rrs .•m.eh :'.'Hl c-:ellin.': jq ''~" 1·.ser or enn:-:.umer and 
not for re::-:alt\ and inel1:,\·c·· ('r'wmi::-;t-linn merchants 
nnd a11 pc>rs:,ns rc:•;11h·+· eng:cJ','Pt1 in tlu~ husi-
ne~;~..; of ~,plJ;ng to m·.r•i'H or r·onsmners within the 
s':1t0 (\r TT1:o.h: hnt tbe L•rm "retailer" noes not 
inehtd.P 1·~~ ~·1:1 r r~;~ r~·:.:. t'd{' ·1p i·~~, :-~tor• >"1 nPn~ nou1try-
1nen nr o·:}H'I' .~-r,~n,_\,.c;·~·. cr :_1rrri(~Ldtu1·nl nrodurers 5 
Pxrept thosp wl1n i'J':> rP,(::ularl~· c~ngap;ed in the 
hnsine':''' of hn,-in~~ or t;(•lli;lg for a nrofit. Tl:e 
hq·;!l ''n•:ail ····n:(•" J:wnns (~very sale within the 
,,Jete of T7 fr•!? h•' :' r·e+c~~)pr· or wholesalr>r to a 
nsPr or r:,n:<mPc·•·. <'XCf'j)[ "1!eh t·mles as arP de 
f'inPd r,s Fl;qlp, .. :]n :;nlec· or otherwisp Pxempterl 
hy the tenns (. ~· ~hie; nd: hut the {P.rm "retail 
snl e '' is not in t 1 ·ndl'll f u indudr isnlof ed nor oc-
casiorwl safes U,if Ji!'l'sons not rt'fJUlarly engaged 
in business, nor seasonal ,-;ales of crops, seedling-
plants, r:arden or farm or other agricultural pro-
duce by the produeer thereof, nor the return to 
the producer thereof of processed agricu'ltural 
products. 
~ection 80-1 fl-2 (a) m defining tlw term "person", 
exeludes by implication the UnitPd States and its agen-
cies, a.-, follow.-;: 
tax. 
and 
(a) 'L'lw term "pt"J'S()ll '' include::; any m-
di\·idcwl. fin::, <·o-parhwr~·!1ip, joint adventnn•, 
eorporation, estntP or trust, or any group or com-
bination <wting a::; :: J)nit :•nd t~1r• plural as well 
a~: thp ~'ingular mllnller nn1Pss th0 intention to 
g!Vl' a rno•·p limit<'d meanin;~· is di:-w!osPd hy thl:' 
C'!lllt<•Xt. 
SN~tion 80-1 :)_;) provides for Ute <·ol'le<'tion of the 
'rhe Vl:'ndor ·~ to eolleet thp tax from the vendee 
lo' to fi I(' n•tnrns hill lOll ( !1IY nn l'o nus prescribed h~· 
tlw Colllmission. This sf'elion also provide:; for the US<' 
of tax tokem;; for plenary n~gulntm·y powf'r of the Corn-
mission 0\'PI' \'Pndors, in('luding- vPnrlnr-liahility for the 
tax; and for int<'rest nnd p0nnltie,...; thf:'reon if not remitted. 
~e<~tion R0-1;)_;~ cover:' li('.Pnsin,!', of Vl:'ndors; Section 
R0-1 fl-!l requi I'<'~' I i<~en S<>Ps to kPP p C'Nta in rl:'<'o rds ; Sec-
tion RO-lfl-1 0 makes the tax a lien agai.n.-;t property of 
V<'ndor; ~Pction R0-1;)-11 pro\'irl<•s t-hat unpaid taxes eon-
stitut<' "a debt rh:.(' ihe staJc from the uendor'" and fur-
ther provi<lPs methorls for (•ollnetion of thp debt; while 
~<>dion R0-1!1-1~) imposPs niminal "anetions npon non-
('omplyinu: YPndors. 
In addition to the specific exemption in Section 80-
15-2(e) quoted above of "isolated" and "occasional 
:,;ales by persons not .regularly eng~aged in business" is 
the exemption by Section 80-15-G of "all sales which the 
~tate of Utah is prohibited from taxing under the Con-
stitution or laws of thc> United States, or of the state of 
Utah." 
b. The Use Tax Statutes. 
Section 80-10-:1 of the Use Tax Act, enacted as Chap-
ter 114, Laws of Utah 10:11, imposes an excise tax on the 
storage, use or other consumption in Utah based upon the 
''sales price'' of ''tangible personal property purchased'' 
unless the Sales Tax has been paid in connection with the 
;:;alt> or sales are otherwise exempt by the specific pro-
Yisions of the aet or the implied provisions carried over 
from the Sales Tax Act. (Union Portland Cement Co. 
Y. Sta tP Tax Commission, supra.) The section reads as 
folows: 
80-16-3. Use Tax. 
ThNe is levied and imposed an excise tax on 
tlw ~~torage, use or other consumption in this 
state nf tangible personal property purchased on 
or after July 1, 1937, for storage, use or other 
consumrtion in this date at the rate of two per 
cent of' the salc•s rJrieP of sll('h property. 
!•~very pen.;on s1oring, using or otherwise 
<'onsnminp; in this ~tatl' tang·ible personal prop-
<'rty pnrr~has1"rl ;,;hall he liable for thl~ tax impoi'l~d 
hy this act, nwl till' liability shall not lw extin-
;~ni ~:l~t>d until t hP tax hac: he> en paid to this state. 
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Under the Use Tax, too, "retailers" must register as 
required by Section 80-16-f); and the retailers arr r)(~r­
sonally liable for the tax wh~ch tloey are rcq1.tired to col-
lect at the time of sale, the tax constituting" a debt owed 
by the retailer to this state." (Sec. 80-lG-6.) 
Section 80-16-lG provides that the Use Tax "shaH he 
a lien upon the property of any retailer"; and the fol .. 
lowing· definitions contained in Section 80-lG-2 exclud-
ing again by implication the United States alii a "re-
tailer'', ''person'', etc. are set forth in full: 
(a) "Storage" nwam; and includes any 
keeping or retcm6on in this state for any pur-
pose except sale in the regular course of busi-
ness of tangible personal property rmrchased 
from .a retailer. 
(c) "Purchase" means any transfer, ex-
change or barter, conditional or otherwise, in an~v 
manner or by any uwans whatsoever, of tangible 
personal property for a consideration. A trans-
action whereby the possession of property, is 
transferred but the seller retain::-; the title as 
security for the payment of the price shall lw 
deemed a purchase. 
(e) "Per . ..,·on" means and in<'ludPs any in-
dividual, firm, copartnPrship, joi11t adventnre, as-
sociation, corporation, <>state, trust, business trust, 
receiver, syndicate, this state, any county, city, 
municipality, district, or other po"litical snhdi-
vision thereof, or any other group or eomhination 
ading as a unit, nnd th(' plural as \\'Pll :1s tlH' 
sing1dar nutnbPr. 
(I") "HetailPr" ntealls and i n(~ludes PVt>ry 
person engaged in the business of making sales 
of tangible personal property for storage, use or 
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otl1er eon:-;umption; prm,ided, when in the opinion 
of the commission it i;,; rweessary for the efficient 
administration of this aet to reganl any salesmen, 
repn•seniativP~, p(~ddlers or canvassers as the 
agents of the d<~alers, di~tributors, supervisors or 
<'lllployers nnder whom tlwy operate or from 
whom tl1t>y obtain the tangible persona·] property 
sold by them, irr~'SlJentivP of whether they are 
making sales, c~n their own behalf or on behalf of 
slwh dr>ah~r;,;, d1:,1rihu1 ·n·;, ;-mj;ervison; or em-
plon~rs, thP eommi <'n may :'o regard them and 
1nay rpg·ard 1 he clPaiPn;, distributors, sup<~rvisors 
or Pmployen:, a~·: rPtailel':' i'nr purposes of this act. 
(h) "Bn~im~,,~;'' inel'lde:.; :my activity en-
~r,ugPd in hY nw.· ,'JeT n:' n1· ('an:wd to he engaged in 
~~~· him v;tlr (hi' oh jf'!'t of qrtin. lwnPfit or advan-
tage PitlJur dir<'d ()J' indin•d. 
( i) "'i'ax" l!H':UIS t II<' tax pa_nthl<' by tlw 
P<'I'O'Oll s[n!'ing·, n,:ing or <'iHl:mllling tan,'-iible per-
sonal property, :he ston~~~·e, usc or consumption of 
whieh is 1-mhjP.et to tax or the aggregate amount 
of taxes due from any n~twiler making sales of 
tnngih'lP pen;nnal fH·orwrty for storage, use or 
other eonsm·'~'tion in this ~;tat<• during- the period 
for which l:e i:; n•quin'd tn ;Pport his r~olledions, 
m: the <·ontcxt may n~qnire. 
(j) "T<i::pa;.:<'r" sha.ll include e'Uery retailer, 
as hPn~in definwl, and evny person storing, using 
or consuming tangiblP pnrsonal property, the 
storag·e, use or r·onsumption of which is subject 
to thP lax impmH'd h.\' ihi>; nd IPIII(cn sur:h. ta:r U'as 
not paid to a rPia.ile.r. 
Consi;:;tent with thP dt>finition of "1'axpayer", the 
civil and l'riminal sanctions of thP o~e Tax Rtatutes (in 
contrast to the Nall~S Tax Spction) extend hevond the 
"rPtailt•r ·' to inelnde HIP Jmrrhoser, who is a·lso with the 
rl'tai]Pr dirPdl_,. liahl<· to tl1<• statp oF UtaJ1 for thP pay-
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ment of the tax where dne. (~ee :-:eetiuns 80-Hi-8, 9, 10, 
1:"',and 18.) 
Nc~ithcr the Rnl<~~ rl'ax Aet TIOJ" the> u~e rrax Act pur-
port:-: to del'ine a "saiP", h~aving this to Section 88-2-11 
of th0 Uniform Snlc~ Aet ('l'itle f\1 of the Utah Code). 
Scetion R0-1fi-2(h) of the Salp:; rl'ax Act does, however, 
hroad<m the term "~ale" to include the following in 
addJition to "sales" a:-:. definc~d hy Utah's statutes which 
otherwiRe <·odify th<> <·.onnnon law definitions: 
rl'hP tPnn ''sal{''' or ''sales'' includes install-
llll'llt and C'rc~dit :n:p~;, nn(1 ih<· exchange of proper-
! iPs as \\'Pll n:~ tll<' :-:d<• t 1l!•n•of fnr nlOlt<•;:, <'Y<•;·~· 
elo:~P<l tnn~;.:;•c! ion ~'''nstituting· a snl0, and also 
includes the sale of el~)e+rieal energy, gas, serviceR 
or entcrtaimrwnt t~·.xahle nml0r the terms of this 
ad. A transaction whereby the possession of prop-
PrtY i:-: transfern•d hut th0 ~·ellPr retains the title 
a~ :-:peuritv for th<• p~·~'lllPnt o:' 1 hp price :-;hall he 
deenwd a sa'lP. 
Attention is partieularly invited to the following 
d0finition:-: eodifying· connnon law meaning:-; in the Uni-
form Sale:-; Aet: 
gl-1-1. Ce<ltrads tr~ Sell and Sales. 
( l) A eontnH·t to sell good~ is a contract 
wh0rehy the :-:ell~>r a:':rPes to transfer the property 
in qoods to t h'' lm:'~'r for a <•onsidN·ation rallNl 
t hp prieP. 
(2) ,\ c::•h· ol' good:-: i:-: an Hif,I'Pf'IllPnt where-
by thP sellPr tnmsf'Prs the property in goods to 
thP hny<'r for n enm~iderntion enllPd tlw prire. 
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III. 
1. '!'!Jp t-)e;~p<· ol' t}l(~ Sales-lT:::;e '!'ax Act Do<~~ Not 
!<~xii·nd t.l 111<' 'l'nuts:;etintJ 1lr>re Tm·olV<'d BPram:p: 
:1. ThP Cou\'<·y~ulC(\ of thP "<Jen(~Va fltpe] Plant'' 
V\Tns :.,ro~ a "S~yJp'' of "'l'ang-ihl<' Personal 
!)roprYtv." 
h. TltP 'l'r;tm:ndion:-; 1>.\ tlH· lJnitr•(l :..;tah•s witlt 
~:·:'('[ ~·-~ 1-~:t' ~' ·(,·,H·1·~1 ~-:~~le-I I)l~~nt~· fl!Hl thP 
. " ! 1 : ;, ; ~ ! ' ! . i { l 
hY (1 {,~o l"Jrl(:t!lt'!".H 
(', ,.~,!:p ;-Sr<)ejfie. Jj~ -~t'lnpt,lon 
nJjon ''Iso]n1(1 d,' and 
HN•' ,\ pplie:-:. 
!<~:-;eluding- from 'fax-
,' ON•.asional Sales'' 
2. 'l'ltP ~tah• or litall DoP:-: Not Have tlH· !'owpr to 
Tllti'rfere with the Di:;;w8al by the United Stat(\~ Oovern-
lllcn! of Its Property: and the Htah Statutes Areording--
ly l•~xcmpt from Sah:-lJs<\ 'Paxation Sal0s hy th<' F'<'d-
f'r:1l Government. 
:L ThP D••i'icient·~· tJse 'l':u As~e~~ment I~ Void, 
Beeau:-;f' Tf' An~· 'l'nx \Yn,, 11Pn• Aprlieahle It wo:dd HP 
tlH' Snl0:-: T:n .. 
!. '! IJ(' Tnx ('t•lliJ:Ji:-::-;ion':-: .\!tPilljl1 to Tax .\l(lll(' 
tlti:-: Tr:tn,,adion 1:-: Di,;nilllillator.\· and 'l'liP!'dnrP \'oid 
:1:-: in \'io];;timt of' tlw I1'f'dPral and fTtah Con:-:titntions. 
IV. 
1. The Scope of the Sales-U8e Tax Acts Does Not 
Extend to the TransacNon Here Involved Because: 
a. Til<• Con\·pymwp of t ht• • · ( lPill'\·a ~tPPI l'lant ·' 
\\'a~ Not a ''~all''' of · • Tangih]p P<•r::-;onal 
Pro1w1"t~·.'' 
b. 'l'lH· Tran::-;aet ion::-; h_,. t l!r lJ nitrd ~tat<·~ wit It 
J"l'~JH'<'l (o thp "O<'!W\"H Slt•p] l'lant" an<1 tltt• 
•• lll\"('lllori<·::-; '' \H•n• not ·•Jidail ~alP~'' Iliad<· 
1'.'" a "1\etai ln." 
<'. Thr ~p<·<·il'il' ]<~x<'IIIJltion l•~x<·luding l'rolll Tax-
ation'' !~olatPd'' and "O<·<·a~ional ~ale::-;" llPn· 
.\ ppliec. 
To <'Oill<' \\·ithin thu ~eope of th<· ~a]p::-;-ll::-;<' Tax <·m·-
Prag<' lltal1 !Ja::-; requin•<l thrN• ba~i<' eo!Hlition~ h<"l'orr HI<' 
~tatntP::-; ar<' appli<·ahl<': 
( 1) '!'lin<' llll!::-;t h<· a ''~alP" ol' '"l'ang-ihlp l'Pr-
::-;onal l'rorwrty" \rithin th(• intt>ndPd ::-;<•n::-;P. 
( :.>.) That ::-;alp of tangihlp p<'n;(lnal prop<'rt~ mu::-;t 
both kl\"<' lH•en Jn:tdp "·'"a" 1\Ptai!n" nnd IH· 
a" HP!ail ~al<·. '' 
(::) 'l'liP ::-;all' mu::-;t lH• ll<'it!J<•r "1::-;ola'<·d" nor 
· · Oc<·a~ional. ·' 
:c. The "Geneva StPPI Plant'' Was Not "Tang·ihle Per-
1-;nn:1l Pn>perty". 
ll<•rp \\·<· Hl'P <'X<·Iuding til<'" l!lVPil1oriP~ ... to ll"lli('li 
!IIi::-; point i::-; inapplil'ahk \\'<' <II'<• n::-;ing (II<' l<'l'lll 
''(;<'IH'Va'' in til<' ::-;0n::-;(• not on!.' u::-;l'd h:-· th\' eontradin,:_o: 
l'i 
paxtieH under 11}xhihit B whieh was the taxable sale, 
hut as ywr paragraph fl of the Stipulation (R. 11 ). 
ThPre it was reeognized that what was sold was an 
''integrated steel plant," including all real and personal 
property, and rights and interests appurtenant thereto, 
eontraets, water rights, mining rights, and permits, 
leases, lieem;es, easements and all other interests or 
rights of t'Yery character in, or pertaining to, or incident 
to the use or operation of thP Geneva Steel Plant at 
Oeneva, Utah, the Geneva Coal Mine near Columbia, 
Utah, the Iron Mountain Ore l\1 ine Facilities at Cedar 
City, Utah, the Quarry F'aeilities at Payson, Utah, and 
the Interehange Yard n<~ar Columbia, Utah. 
True, so defined Ueneva neeesfmrily im~ludes items 
which if takt'n separately would be tanf.,>ihle personal 
property, just as the light glolH's, earpet::;, blimlF: an<l 
otlwr parts or a house or huil<ling might he if treated 
and sol<l separatel~·. But just as <~very day sneh items 
(in part fixtun's and in part ]Wn:onalty) are sol<l as a 
part of the realt~·, tlo l1ere with the int<'grated Oeneva 
~tt>Pl Plant whieh like\\·isp was sold atl a unit. 
'PIH' l<•gislatiYe intent not to tax the ineidental trans-
fer of title to Hnch personal propert)'· when it consti-
tutes but a part of the transfer of an integrated busi-
ness or property nnit in the nature of a eapital asset to 
a n<>w ownPr, app<'arH !'rom th<' following: 
( 1) 'I'll<' 'l'itle or ill<' ~ales Tax l'X(lrlJSSPS the in-
tPntion of th(' Legislatun' to tax the sale or ··commodi-
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lies, admi::-;::-;iom; and scrviees." (Chapter G~3, Laws 1D:3:3.) 
The ::-;ale of Geneva was no mo rc the sale of a ''com-
modity" than it com;tituted an "admission" or a "ser-
vice''. 
\\'pbster \; l'~neyelopedie Didiona ry definPs ''Com-
Jtwdit;;" a::.; follows: ''speeifieally, ait artie]<> of mer-
<·handi::.;e; anything movable that is bought and sold, as 
gtlOOS, wares, proouet• of land and Humufadurer::-;. '' 
This trammetion constituted the single sale of an 
''integrated steel plant,'' <·omprising in one unit Uw nel'-
essary <·ompone11t:-; of land, buildings, uanes, water 
rights, eontraets, loeomotives, mining rights, eondnits, 
gooct will, ami. all the other n~quisite items which wen• 
an integral part th(>rt>of. True, the plant might havP 
bet>n, or now ex post facto may he brolwn do\vn into 
its variou::.; parts. But to transmute the single actual 
transfer of tl1e interrratcd plant into a senes of sales 
of it:,; counties:,; parts, smue of whieh may be tangihiP 
personal property, seems to us to do violenee not onl)· 
to a non:,;everable eontrad, hut to the obvious meanmg 
of the Utah :-;tatute::.;. 
The law speaks of the "::-;ah~" and a tax bas<>d upon 
thP '' purl'ha:,;c priee'' of ''tangible pcr::.;onal property'' 
sold at "retail" by a "retailer." The Legislature aid 
not :,;peak of a tax hase<i upon the "tran." fer" of "all 
tangihl<> pt>r:,;onal propprty ", sold hy "an~· pPrson in-
eluding !h<' lTni!<>d Stah•s," and whe!h<>r ''in<'idnntal lo 
tlw saiP of an int<•gra!!'d hw.;inp:,;s, or :,;old alone as 
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tangible per::;onal property." ( ~~80-lf>-4 and 80-16-3.) 
'l'his contract was not divisible, except as between 
''Cleneva" and the "Inventories". Battle Creek Wrap-
ping ~tach. eo. v. Paramount Baking Co., 88 Utah 67, 
;{!l P. 2d ~2~. 
( 2) Since 19:1:3 and until this single isolated ocea-
sion, defendant Tax Commission bas withou.t exception 
<·onstrued Utah'::; statutes administratively to exempt 
::;ueh transadiom; as beyond the intended scope of tax 
<·overage. Never has it attemph~d to tax the transfer of 
thP eash register of' the eOI·ner grocery store which 
ehanges hands: the elwin;, tahlPs and silverware of the 
n•Htanrant sold to a ll('W operator; the electric range 
ineluded in the ::;ale of .John Dop's home; or the countle::;::; 
othpr transaetions identical with the incidental transfeT 
of I a llfl ibl e pcrsmwl pro peTty in connection with the sale 
of (Jenera, excPpt perhaps for si1w. (l'~x. H, R. 111.) 
For <>Xamph•, whPn the old 'l'radion Company sold 
its s.vstelll to the Salt l"'ake City J-'ines during the war, 
no tax was imposed on the transfer of its several hundred 
lmssl's-obvionsly tangible personal property. \Vhen the 
f-ltandard Oil Cmnpany of California after the war sold 
ltlost of its Utah service stations to various independent 
·' Clwvron '' owner-operators, the Commission did not 
tax t hP ineidental transfer to the npw owners of the 
fllllll p~, gangp~ and otlwr a rtie\ps or tang-ihle per:-;onal 
proprrt:· l'Olllprising tlw hulk of the transaction. ThP 
PXalllJliP~ or F:xhihit H eonl<l be multiplied pndlefisly to 
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the one end: that until Geneva attraeted public attention 
no one com;idered for a moment that the Sale~-U~e '!'ax 
Acts applied to the transfer to new owner:-; of capital 
assets to the extent any tangihle penwnal property wa~ 
involved. 
(3) 'l'he Legislature ha~ not changed the statutes 
to correct the Commission's construction as contrary to 
legislative intent. On the contrary, in l!);W it added the 
consistent "isolated" or "occasional sale" exelusion in 
defining the scope of tax coverage. 
( 4) Nothing in the cases decided hy this court dis-
cussing the purpose of the Sales-Use 'l'ax Acts or the 
construction of the statutes here involved lends support 
to the Commission's novel contention now made with 
respect to Geneva alone. 
The nearest applicable case seems Utah Concrete 
Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 514, 
125 P. 2d 408, where the Commission assessed a Use 
Tax against a manufacturer using his own product:-;. 
There this court set the assessment aside because uo 
sale at all had occurred as the necessary taxable incident. 
Here we ask for the same result, because while a ''sale'' 
occurred, it did not involve the "retail sale" by a "re-
tailer" of "tangible personal property", nonisolated and 
nonoccasional, whieh iH tht> prNeqni~itp of either ~ah~~ 
or nsp tax liahility. 
( 5) Hore at no tiwe ha:-; there been a "purchase 
price" for the tangible personal property in eluded in 
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the sale of Geneva upon which the tax could he hased. 
This was not by (le::;ign or a fraud; it is inherent in the 
nature of this and similar tran::;actions. (gx. B and Stip. 
par. 12, 14, 1fl, 17 and 19; R. 12-1:1.) 
We do not contend that a tax otherwise applicable 
can he defeated by the deviee of lumping the price for 
the per::;onal property with the price paid for other 
propert~· items. W <'do submit that the inherent difficulty 
in making such a segregation where sales of inJt,egrated 
/;usin·essPs arw concerned, here illustrated hy the exten-
;-;ive a::;sumption::; that thP Commission has made in this 
ease, argues again that the legi::;lature did not intend to 
include transfers of tlw tangible personal property por-
tions of integrat0d business within the Rales-Use 'l'ax 
coverage. 
'!'he nature of this integration is apparent from ex-
amination of ex port facto J<:xhihit ~) (R 17rl). fncluded 
in the tram;fer to plaintiff of Geneva were, for exam-
ple, ''\Vater Claim::; and Appli(~ations" together with 
"mnniments of title". \Vhile in one ::;ense (HP::;tatement 
of thP Law-Property, See. 8(c)) sn<'h may he "per::;onal 
property'', tangible and intangible, since 1~);~;) ::;ur~h items 
have never been segregated from the realty for sales-and-
use tax purpo::;es in the countless every-day sales of real 
prorwrt~· with accompanying transfers of ahstracts of 
tid<·. waiN right <'Prtifieah~s. and ;-;irnilar items. 
And so with "all oth(~r items or portable and sta-
tionary maehine, tools, machinery and equipment," etc. 
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listed in ex post facto Exhibit 9 of November, 194G. In 
Southern California 'l'elephone Company v. State Board 
of Equalization, 82 P. 2nd 422, the Supreme Court of 
California held a central telephone exchange to be a 
single unit of .real prow~rty for ta.r purposes, although 
it was composed in part of eountles:-; articles readily 
portable and not attached to the building in the usual 
sense of fixture~ becoming a part of the realty. 
( 6) Although most states have adopted the Sales-
-Use Tax sysem, and neither government sales of war 
plants nor every-day transfers of property units are con-
fined to Utah alone, no other state appears to have at-
tempted such action as was here initiated by the de-
fendant C'ormnission. However as noted hereinafter, 
three states have amended their statute~ to cover \Var 
Snrplut-> retail sales. 
(7) A further indication of the legislative intent to 
exclude transactions of this nature is that generally the 
personal property concerned in such cases has alrearly 
been subjected, as here, to the coverage of the Sales-
Use rl'ax Acts at the time each component item was pur-
chased at retail prior to becoming a part of the inte-
grated business. Of course this contention is not con-
trolling in itself. It does lend pradieal support, how-
<>V<~r, to the e]aim that in('idPntaJ transf'PJ"S of the ih•Jllt-; 
of tnovahl(', tangihl<' pPrsonal prop<•rty <·omprit->ing an 
inl!'grat<•d lm;-;iness are not again subjeet lo tlw lax 
wlwn tlw entire husiness is sold as a unit. 
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b. The Transactions by the United States with respect 
to t·he "Geneva! Steel Plant" and the "Inventories" Were 
~~nt "Heiail Sales" Ma<le by a "Hetailer". 
'l'l1P (Jovernment is not a" retailer", "doing a regu-
larly orp;ani11<•d r<>tail huc;iness," and" known to the pnh-
li(' as suel!." (§§ 80-1:l-2(a) and 80-1(i-2(h).) 'Phose words 
appl,\· (o tht~ Z.( '.:\1.1., the eonwr dl'llg c;tore, th<' markets, 
and the lli~Tia<l others in thP eat<~gori<~s whid1 WP all know 
to IJ(' PT1g·:1g-ed in the lmsin<~:;s of selling to eonc;nrnen; the 
vast suppl~· of availahl<> "eommodities ". 
'PlH• 0 ov<•nllnPnt was not making tlwse salr>s "with 
U1e ohjP<'t ol' gain··; it was dispo:;ing of its Snrpltts 'Var 
Plant eonstru<'ie<l and a<·quired in th<• tragic "husiness'' 
11!' tliP TTnit<'d Stal<'s to wage war. 
The Oov<'rmnent is hy· implieation t~xelll<led as a 
"per:;on''; "rdailers" are limile<l to ''persons", h,v th<' 
wording· of the statntes. ( §~80-l:l-2( e) an<l RO-lfi-2( f).) 
l•~xpressly· by§ RO-Hi-2(a) ":;iorage" (and by· impli-
<'ation, too, both "eonc;nmption" aml ''use'') i::-; to ]H• 
emnbin<'d with a "pnr<'lmse from a rPlail<•r" hPfore then• 
is liSP tax liability·. 1 I PIH'<', wl1ile in a hroa(l s<'n~u thurf'-
i'on~ tl1P (;oyermnPnt through "'ar Assds Administration 
or evc•n H.F.C. mig·ht lmve huPn lllaking sales of jeeps, 
o-:l<><'ping lmg·s and radios to ultimatP <•onsnnwr~, still thP 
FnilPd States was not a "rP1ailPr" as rf,,fioerl fu1 f!te 
s/a/ 11! 1'-' f!l'/"1' II Jiji/ii'ii/J/1'. 
l•'ttr11H·r, th(' dii'I'Pn•Jl(~(' IH'1\\'C'('!l a rdail sah' or a 
.iP<'Jl, ;l!ld thP sal .. ol' llH• <Jprwva StP<'l Plant, would S<'Ptll 
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J'or tax purposs to he at least as r<'<Hlily <iistinguishahle 
as 1110 saln of' his rash register hy the corner grocer from 
sales of l1is groceries. 1'he Tax Commission has had no 
tronhh~ in f'iftepn ypars in saying that the grocer's "busi-
ness" is ronl"inP<l to tl1e salP of groeeries; and thus when 
}I<' lmppPlwd to sPll l1is eash n•gistPr hP was not a "re-
taiiPr " . 
.Just hPc~aHsP a liePnsc~cl n•tailer is such for some pur-
posE's does not suhjeet to taxation every sale he makes. 
As was said hy thP Miehigan Rupreme Court in Acorn 
fron \Yorks v. Auditor 0Pneral, 2!14 N.W. 126: 
To smue extent dc~fendants stress the fact that 
'''!'he• plaintiff at bar Pngages in the retail sales 
husinPss, aml has appliPd for and accepted a li-
cense nnder Hw general sales tax act; it main-
tains on hand in its shop a stock-in-trade, consist-
ing of from 100 to 200 tons of structural steel 
111aterial." Bnt it does not follow from the eircum-
stanees just above noted that merely hecanse some 
ol" plaintiff's transactions are subject to the sales 
tax therefore all of its hnsiness is likewise sub-
_ject to the• tax. One ma~· be hoth a retailer and a 
,,·holesalc•r of lliPn•.llandise, hut elearly by the very 
tc•rms of thP statuto (s0dion 2) the sales tax law 
applies only to his "~alc~s at retail." And likewise 
one" nm~· he hotl1 a rdailPr of lllPrehandise and a 
dPal('r in n•al Pstate, hnt even so the sales tax 
would not he appliC'ahle to his real estate dealings. 
Thf• stat<> hoard of tax administration from 
lillH' to tirnp has (•hangc~d its c•.onstnwtion :md 
IIIPIIJod of PTifOJ"('ing thp salc•s tax law :lS it af-
1\•C'fS building tradp transac·tions; hut in this eon-
rwction it is suffieic•nt to notP that liability for 
pannf'nt of' the sales tax is eontrcYII(•<i hv st~tnte. 
• 0 
2.1 
lt cannot he impm;ed hy rulings or regulations of 
the~ hoard. 
'''I' ax exaetions, property or excise, must rest 
upon legislative enactment and collectors can act 
only within express authority conferred thereby, 
the scope of such laws cannot be extended hy im-
plication or forced construction and language, if 
dubious, is not resolved against the taxpayer.'' 
(Syllabus) .J. B. Simpson, Tne. vs. O'Hara, 277 
Mi<'h. fifi, 2fiR N.W. 809. 
So here not only was neither the United States nor 
its agencies the R.F.C. and W.A.A. a "retailer" as de-
fined and required hy Utah's statutes; but to the extent 
the United States d~id make sales at retail in the sense 
that the buyers were the ultimate consumers, these sales 
were limited to the thousands of jecps and sleeping hags 
and eleetric motors. 'f'hey did not extend to sale of the 
single, isolated Geneva Steel Plant which was a tran-
saction of an entirely dijferr-nt character; namely, the 
conveya,nce of an "£ntegratrd steel plant" to a rww 
operata,·. 
Sueh transactions are not retail sales of commodi-
ties; they are sales of eapi~tal assets and as sneh consti-
tute an entirely different category from normal retail 
sale transactions. That this difference is wc~ll reeognizt~d 
can be proved hy l"t'lc~rence to income> tax decisions, both 
state and federal. 
c. The Specific Exemption of "Isolated and Occasional 
Sales'' Here Applies. 
Utah's statutes specifieally exempt from Sales-Use 
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Tax Coverage sales which are either "isolated" or in the 
alternative, "occasional". Plaintiff contends that the 
tram;fer to it of Geneva comes within that category. 
Plaintiff has been restricted by the Government 
from selling Geneva for at least another three years by 
the terms of the first sale in its history. (Ex. B, R. 30L) 
Common knowledge informs us that the sale of Geneva 
was not only "isolated" in the sense that it was segre-
gated and separated from the usual run of sales of 
tangible personal property at retail; but also that the 
transaction was "()ccasional" in that it was casual, in-
cidental, infrequent, and pertaining to an occasion-the 
tPHts found in Webster or any elementary dictionary. 
For example, Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary 
defines ''occasional'' as: ''Incidental; occurring at times, 
but not regular or systematic; made or happening as 
opportunity requires or admits." 
Publicity attendant the transfer to private industry 
of Geneva makes known to every Utahn at least, the 
unusual event which has taken place-far beyond the 
occasional sale every day of other businesses or inte-
grated properties, including incidental thereto compon-
ent items of tangible personal property which the Com-
mission recognizes are exempt. 
rrtw title to Chapter 110, Laws of Utah 1937, which 
<'rPated this express exemption to the Sale::;;-Use 'l'ax sys-
tem, rpad::.;: ''An Act • • * Jjjxempting from 'raxation • • • 
T sola ted 'rransactionH and Oceasional Transactions In-
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volving Transfer of Property Rights from Persons nolt 
Engaged in a Regular/;jj Constituted Business or Enter-
prise Subjected to Taxation by the Terms of the • 
Act." 
• • 
It appears to us obvious beyond argument that the 
Federal Government was not so engaged in a ''regularly 
constituted business or enterprise" subjected to taxa-
tion by the State of Utah. 
For convenience we reprint at this time Section 39 
from the Commission's Sales and Use Tax regulations 
with respect to isolated and occasional sales (Ex. 1, R. 
113): 
Isolated or occasional sa:les made by persons 
not regularly engaged in business are not subject 
to the tax. Under this rule no sale is taxable if it 
is not made in the regular course of a business of 
a person selling tangible personal property. 'The 
word ''business'' as thus used refers to an entler-
prise, engaged in selling tanbl"jble personal prop-
erty notwithstanding the fact .that the sa1es may 
he few or infrequent. 
All sales made by ofj'icers of a court, pur-
:mant to court orders are occasional sales, with 
the exception of sales made by trustees, receivers, 
assignees and the like in connection with the 
liquidation or conduct of a regular established 
place of business. Examples of such casual sales 
are those made by sheriffs in foreclosure proceed-
ings and sales of confiscated property. 
Under both the wording of the statutory exemption 
and the Commission's amplification thereof the exclu-
sion here applies. 
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rrhe present attempt to subject this transaction to 
tax coverage appears to be the original idea of the de-
fendant Tax Commission, in this case, aided and abetted 
by the Attorney General. (Ex. 3, R. 158-163.) That 
attempt, we submit, is contrary to both legislative intent 
and the Commission's own past practice. As shown by 
J1.Jxhibit '' H, '' the Commission has never before taxed 
this type of transaction. 
At this point it might he weB to refer to the Attor-
ney General's first opinion of September 25, lH47 (Ex-
hibit 3) wherein he states: 
''An argument advanced by the Geneva Steel 
Company which gives me considerably more con-
cern is their contention that the sale of Geneva 
Steel property did not constitute the sale of 
tangible personal property ih;elf, that the sale 
was a sale of an entire going concern and that 
no distinction was made between real property 
and personal property, and that the entire prop-
erty, because of the manner in which it was 
handled, took on the charaeteristics of real prop-
erty. f:iupport is given to this argument by dicta 
found in a eoncurring opinion in the Utah case 
of Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 505. If, in fact, 
this sale h(zd been regarded and treated by the 
parties thet·eto as a single sale of a going old 
concern, we would be inclined to follow the lan-
.Q1tage of the court in the above mentioned case. 
T t does not appear, however, that the parties so 
<'Onsidered the sale." 
\Vhen the reeord in the formal hearing established 
beyond argument. that the transaction was the singl1~ 
sale of "an integrated steel plant", for this and other 
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reasons, the 'l'ax Commission gave the Attorney General 
a chance to correet and change his opinion. lnstead hP 
in effect said by his letter of .June 25, EW:\: "I will 
not change my first opinion even though it was bot-
tomed upon false premises.'' 
It was the Attorney Uenerai, too, who insisted that 
m spite of the Commission's regulations the deficiency 
assessment to be levied agaim;t Geneva in this case 
should be under the Use ~'ax law and not under the 
Sales 'J'ax Act. ( J;-:Jxhibit :n 'I' he Attorney General's 
letter of December 13, 1947 is also interesting· in that 
from his information he then felt that the sale was not 
being made by the Reconstruction Finanee Corporation. 
(l<}xhibit 3) The record now dearly shows, however, 
that the sale was made in Utah hy the United States, 
which used as its operating ageneies the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation for holding title and operating 
Geneva, the "\Var Assets Administration merely a;-; tlw 
sales agent, and the Treasurer for payment. ( Stipula-
tion pars. 4, 13 and 14.) But as noted, the Attorney 
General directed the Commission nevertheless to make 
t.hP- assessment. ( f1Jxhihit 4.) 
Recourse to the laws and interpretations of our sis-
ter states indicates a few instances where the isolated 
and occasional sale exelusion has been interpreted. 
rn Iowa, under Rule :~0, reecipts l'rom "easual or iso-
lated sales'' arc not subject to the sales tax law. J-<~x­
amples are where a person sell;-; his household furniture 
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or a fanner his farm implements. ( CCH {i0-2:~:q 
In Alabama tlwn· is a sllliliar exemption, and an At-
torm•y General's opinion ~fa~' 12, 19~7 (CCH 65-057.07) 
lwld-'' Property may be sold by a n~tailer free from the 
tax as an oecasional sale if the sale of sneh property is 
<>ntirely disassoeiate<l f'ro1t1 his rdail business and if the 
property ~was originally pnrehased for his own personal 
use. 
In Arkansas, Section 140!J:-l.4(m) eontains an exemp-
tion whieh reads: "Oros:-; rPeeipts or gross proet>eds de-
tived from isolated sales not made by an established 
husiness.'' 
Then• Js a similar <>Xcmption in the Illinois law for 
"isolated or occasional sales of tangible personal prop-
Prty at retail hy a penwn who does not hold himself out 
as (•ngaging in the husinPss or selling such tangible per-
sonal property." Under the Ref.,'1llations, Article T, an 
example is giwn of a rE>tailer iielling tangible personal 
prop<•rty sueh as maehinery or other capital assets which 
he has U!'e<l in his business and no longer needs and 
\vhich he do<~s not otht>rwise engage in selling as a part 
of his n•gnlar hnsiness. 
Tn Michigan, Section ;-)()1 9.1 states that the term 
''sale at retail" shall not include an isolated transaction 
in whi<·lt an~, tangihlP personal property is sold, trans-
f<>rr<>d. ol'f<>rPd For salP, d<'., not in the onlinar:v eounw 
of' rqH•ah•d and slw<·t~:-:sivp transac-tion~ of a lilw eharae-
t<>r. An exarnpiP eitP<l h~· H<•gulation H interpreting this 
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statute i~ a :-;ale by a merdtant of his easlt reg-ister. ( Cl'lt 
60-021.) 
Jn South Dakota the law provides: "the isolated or 
oecasional sale of tangible personal propc>rty at retail 
hy a pNson who doe:-; not hold himself out as eng·agPd in 
the business of ~elling sueh tangible per~onal propert~· 
at retail, doPs not eonstitute sueh a person a retailer." 
The Regulations then state that '"!'his means a mer-
ehant ma;~ sell hi~ storc> f'ixtures or a farmer may sell a 
horse or eow. Disposal of property for pnrpose:s of 
liquidation " ·• ·• an• depmed to he tangible salf~s." 
In Washington, h~· l{ule 11Hi, ~ale:,; an~ deemed to lw 
"oc.easional or isolatc>cl" when uwdP by a person who i:-; 
not engagpd in the lmsine:,;:,; of ;,;elling the tnw of prop-
erty that rna~' bp ineidentall~· sold b~T him. gxainples 
given are the :sale::; of c·apital as::;ets. (CCH G4-00:t) 'T'lH· 
lli'l~ tax is there ealled the "emnppn::;ating tax", and it 
eontains no exemption for easual salf's. However, in a 
ruling under thP ::;amp Hul<' lO(i. intprprf'ting Sc>ction 
~;no-:12 of ~Washington's Co<h·, it was held: 
lTndPr thP said ruling the retail salPs tax 
would not appl.Y upon ::;w·h transadions ( <'al'nal 
sales). FnrthennorP, th<• use of propert~' so a<'-
quired won 1<1 not hP sn hj Pet to the ('OJ II rwn:;;ating· 
tax. 'l'he :;;amp n•asoning· for granting immunit~· 
on the rPtail sah•s tax ,,.otlld appi,Y to the <'Oill-
)Hmsating- tax, and tltis ('onnnission has nniform-
1.\" applied stwh inh•rpr<'lntion in Stl<'h <·as!'s. 
This ruli11g is silllilar io tlmt of this ('OIIrt in Union 
::o 
Portland CellH'Ut Company v. State rl'ax Commission, 
supra. 
lj'rom the undisputed facts plaintiff submits that 
with respect to the Geneva Steel Plant, no "retail sale" 
of "tangible personal property" occurred within the in-
t<~nt of Utah's Legislature expressed in the statutes as 
(~nacted. And with respect to hoth "Geneva" and the 
"Inventories", plaintiff submits that there occurred no 
:-;ale hy a "n>1ailcr" as was also n•qnired by the Legisla-
tnn· as a pn•n•quisitt> to Sal<•s-TTse 1'ax liability. 
And further, in thP light of the exclusion of isolated 
and occasional sales from tax coverage, Utah's Legisla-
tnn~ never intendP(l to subject suc>h transactions to taxa-
tion. 
2. The State of Utah Does Not Have the Power to 
!nt:;.-fe1·e WH·h The Disposal By the United States Govern-
ment nf Its Property; and the Utah Statutes Accordingly 
Exe1upt Frm:~ Sales-Use Taxation Sales by the Federal Gov-
enlment. 
'l'he next basiH for plaintiff's claim that the tax 
assessed hy the defendant is improper is that these sales 
by the f,ederal go?Jernment are ex(~mpt by reason of that 
nery fact. This eontention is two-fold; not only is it 
heyond thP pownr of ttw State of Utah to interfere with 
t IH· :-;o\'('l'<'igll Fnit0d Stat<'c' in itt<' p<'rformanc>P of' th(' 
latt<'r':-; govPrrunpntal l"mwtions: hnt also in reeognition 
ol" tltat prineiplP both thP Utah ::-laiPs and Use rl'ax stat-
utP:-; ltavP t>xempted stwh Hales from tax coverage. 
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a. Uhth has exempted sales by the Feder-c~.l Govern-
ment:. 
In full recognitio11 of the princ·iple that one sovereign 
cannot interfere with the functions of another sovereign, 
Utah in enacting its Sales-Use '!'ax plan carefully avoided 
interfering· with tlw I•'<>dc~ral Oovnnm<'nt b~· PXC'Illpting 
sales made by it. 
'l'hus Uhth -under both the Hales and Use 1'1M Acts 
has excluded tlw l<'e<leral Government from its defini-
tion of a "person", who as a ''retailer" makes retail 
sales. (§~80-1ii-2(a) and R0-1G-2(e).) Accordingly the 
United States is not reqnired by the terrns of Utah 
sfa.fuJ!'s to c~ithc~r eolleet the tax or report with respect 
tht>rdo ( § R0-1:1-i">): to h(•lieensHl (RO-li">-::n: or n~gistprP<1 
(§ R0-16-fl); to keep the required records (§ H0-15-9); 
its property is not subject to a lien (% 80-15-10 and 80-
Hi-16): no deht is owed by the United States to Utah 
(§§ 80-1G-ll and 80-Hi-G): nor is the United States crim-
inally liable for failure to collect the tax (§ 80-lfl-19). 
Also, §§ 80-15-G and 80-1 G-4 (b) expressly exempt 
transactions which the State of TTt ah "is prohibited 
from taxing under Hw Constitution or Laws of the 
United States." 
I•'rom these provisiOns it seems clear that Utah's 
Legislatnrp explicitly directed the Commission to keep 
"hnnds off" of sal0s of tangible personal property made 
by thC' l~'<'d<'ral Clovernment, to the sam<' effppt and f~X­
tent as if the statutes expn~ssly PX<~mpted "Hales hy the 
Federal Uovl'rmi!Pnt. ''To <'OnstnH· lTtah 's statnt<'s othPr-
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w1se would not only be inconsistent with the specific 
directions indicating intention to exempt, but would risk 
th<' very constitutional pitfalls hereafter discus:o;ed which 
it seems plain the Legislatnre expressly sought to avoid. 
No doubt the dt>fl'ndant will say: Utah is not inter-
fering with any function of the United States. We are 
only exacting a tax afh~r the property ha:-; been trans-
ferred to plaintiff by thf' Federal Hovernment, and we 
seek to tax not this disposal, bnt plaintiff's storage, usP 
and eonsumption of thf' property here involved. 
In the first place, such contention ignores the direct 
effe<·t of sud1 a tax on the disrwsal thereof hy the Govern-
lllent whieh is IHlll!fWr<>d in its efforts pro tanto to tl1e 
<>xt<mt of thP ex post fa<'io tax. 
Also, contrary to the Comrni:-;sion's contention, not 
a II ''uses" are suhjeet to Utah's Use 'l'ax unless express-
ly or impliedly exempt. A:-; previously noted, it is a gen-
<~ral condition precedent to any tax that the "use" fol-
low a purchase from a "ret.rLiler ". \Vhile under the Sales 
Tax Aet this sale by a retailer i:-: the express incident 
taxPd, Rtill in thP easp of th<> Use 'T'ax it is likewise es-
spntial but as a condition precedrnt to the named tax-
mg im~idrnt of "storagf', use or oth<>r eommmption." 
Tn thr Utah Concrett• Products Case, ::;upra, the 
Comlllission, attempting to liSP thP Usp '/'ax a:-; the con-
V<>niPnt eatehall for any storag<' or nse, was told hy this 
('()llrt that ''the L(~gislatun~ eontemplat<~d transfer of 
rig-ht, till<> or proywrt_\' from OIH' }Jif'n-:on to another" as 
the necessary condition precedent. This case now goes one 
step further: while a transfer did take place, it was not 
the kind of transfer contemplated by the Le6rislature 
since inter alia made by the Federal Government. And 
since sales by the Federal Government are excluded, the 
Government being neither a "person" nor a "retailer" 
under § 80-16-2, the necessary condition precedent is here 
missing. Just as where storages or uses occur where no 
sale has taken place, there is here no liability imposed. 
The clearest spelling-out of this Legislative intent 
is perhaps § 80-16-2(a) which in these words so restricts 
Use Tax liability to instances where tangible perfonal 
property is "purchased from a retailer." But the pat-
tern to exclude federal sales is consistent throu1,hout 
all the other provisions of both the Sales and Use Tax 
Acts. 
No doubt, too, the defendant will argue that the 
trend away from inter-governmental immunity here ap-
plies, and the point next argued by plaintiff is no longer 
the law. 
But should it be that under today's concepts Utah 
now ha.s the power to tax such transfers by the Federal 
Government, still the Utah statutes have not at least to 
date been amended to extend tax liability to such trans-
actions. The Legislature still must act, as did that of the 
Stat(~ of Towa which r-ecrntly amenrled its Section 6943.-
076 to read : 
Section 6943.076. Exemptions. 
1. The gross receipts from sales of tangible 
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personal property which this state is prohibited 
from taxing under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States or under the Constitution of this 
state. ( 1'his is the same exemption found in the 
Utah sales and usp tax.) Purchases of tangible 
personal property from tlw Government of the 
United States or an:· of its ar~encies by ultimate 
consumers are hm·0hy <](~clan'd to he subject to 
the state use tax. 
The last sentence was added hy amendment, it hav-
mg previow;ly been held that sales hy the Government 
were not taxable. ( CCH G0-211.) 
This court has held that an amendment would still 
be required in such a case. Van Cott v. State Tax Com-
mission, 98 Utah 264, 95 P. 2d 740, involving the disap-
pearance of the inter-governmental income tax immunity. 
By substantially the same Iant,'1Iage ar; in the ease 
of Iowa, California ( ~ee. 6402) and Connecticut (See. 
e3Gl.58) have likewise recently amended their Sales-Usc 
Tax laws to now include ''property reported to the Sur-
plus Property Board of the United States". 
b. Utah Lacks Power to Interfere with Functions of 
the Federal Government. 
'rhe sovereign Government of the United States with 
respect to the very transactions now sought to be t,aJJed 
by the Commission has said : 
"It is g(>nerally recognized that the \VarAs-
snts Administration and otheJ' disposal agencies of 
the Federal Government cannot be subjected to 
an;y sfa.le or locnl f.a:res 11'ith respect to snles m.ade 
by t'hen1. * * * ThP prineiplP * " • must be recog-
35 
ni/',ed as n~tnaining unimpaired by anything we do 
wit It respe<'t to thi~ tax problPm." (liJx .• J, R. 
114.) 
Mindful of thi:,; current reiteration of a fundamental 
principle of eon:o;titutional law, deelared by the United 
Rtate:,; Suprem{' Court in McCulloch vs. Maryland, 17 
U.S. l;)!J, 4 Wheat. :n (), 4 L. ljJd. 379, we see from para-
graph 23 of tliP Stipulation ( R I i\) and I<Jxhihit .J that 
the (~overmnent--
( 1) has rwither h<•Pn li<~PnsPd nor n•gist<~red as a 
'' retailer'' ; 
(2) has 1witlwr t•olluded i.IJ<' tax, nor reported 
as reqnirt>d by lTtah statutes if applicablP; 
(:l) has instruet~~d its lTtah oft'ie<• not to eolleet 
sueh taxes in sueh <·.ases as this. 
Thus de:,;pite "new look'' e<ITH'<•pts, herp the Federal 
Oovernment still asserts that for Utah to attempt to tax 
federal sales is unconstitutional. True, in fairness thP 
UnitPd ~·Hates has agrt'ed in the case of retail sales only 
to collect the substantial ('quivalent of tltP Utah tax im-
pose<i on ::;imilar retail :-;ales of jl•t•ps, :-;leeping bagt;, elee-
tric motor:-; an<i th<• like, but 011 ds own terms and as a 
condiftion of :w{P. This i~ an entircl~· <iiffcrent :-;ituation 
from submitting to a JI()1H'r tn ta..r, regardlcs:-; of inter-
g-overmnen tal eou rtes:v or fai rnnss. 
Here, too, th<> 11'<'dnral Uo\'<'l"lllllPnt did not and re-
[1MWd to imposp pa~·mpnt to lTtall of sueh equivahmt a:-; 
a eondiiion of tlw !'alP ol' Geneva or othPr integrat<~d war 
plant~. F'ailing- thi:-; ''r·ooperation" on thP part of tiH• 
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Oov~·rnnwnt, th<• def'pndant Collllllist'ion now ex po~t 
f'aeto a~sert::; an allep;Pd pmrer fo tax which it never had, 
tlw l''ederal OnvPrTIIllL'n( rPfusps to rPeognizP, and which 
tht' LPgislaturp to datP has Jl('\'Pl' hE>en so hold as to seek 
to invokE>. 
Ignoring thP faet that tlw Hnit<>d ~tatPs is not a 
'' n~tailt>r'' as dPI"int'd h~· ,;;atute~· whieh in fnrther r<:>-
spPctt' alt'o <'xelnd~:> the Oovenmwnt: failing to di:'ltinguish 
hrtween the n•tail sal<• of a jePp as personal property and 
the it'olatell ami o<·r·asional c'!IIP of personalt:v· ineident 
to tlw unit conve~ran<'<' of <!Pnt·va as r<>alty; eon fusing 
the powl~r to tax with tht• ri···!Jt of th<> sellPr to impo:'<' 
<·ontradual <·onditiont' in making salet'; tht> defendant 
on thri<·P-n•itNntt'd advi('<' f1·om t!H· Attorney <lPJwral 
has finall:-· nwd<' thit' attpmpt to <·oll<>('t additional rP\'-
\'l1ll<'. 
If mad<' IJ:v· tll<> L<·.~:·it'laturp s1wh an attPmpt h:-· tht• 
~tat<> of lTtnh to int<'rfpn• \\·ith ti!P Federal Oov!:'rn-
tllt>nt ':' dit'JWc':Jl of its prop(•rt~· would be Yoid. A fortiori 
\';lJpn• Iliad<· h:; tiH· Co!l!lliissinn in 'Tiolation of' Ftah 
statut<'t' wilieh ;:n• <lPt'ign<>d and arP to be eonstnwd to 
aYoid stwlt tmcont'titntionnl T'<'Sillls. 
That tlw doetrint> of immunity between sovereigns as 
here applied is a living, controlling- principle despitt> 
other changes in eonstitutional law concepts is ch'ar 
rrom siJ•lilar aikmpts of the dates to tax fedNal sales 
;d Pm t ''~xehangPs during t1w J'('('(~n( war. vVhPn flw:-w 
a ( jpJU pt.t' \\Pl'P Jte](] Void U rtdPl' <' j t}w [' (}Jp sales IJ r USE' 
t:l\. lawt', (e.g., Valls City BrPwing ('o. v. Heeves, 40 
F. Supp. :1fl) Congn,::-;s eonected what it eon~iden•d an 
unfairness in 1940 by what is now the Act of .July :w, 
1947, Ch. 389. (U.S.C.A., Title 4, §§ 104 et seq.) 
But while permitting under that Act ::-;tate taxing of 
military sales of motor fuels, ete., subsr,quent to 1940, 
under sales and US(; tax aets, in eertain specified eases, 
Congress maintainPd the principle of immunity, in part 
saymg: 
(a) The provisiOn~ of f.wetiom; 1();) and J()(i 
of this titiP shall no/ he rlee!i/crl to rll!llwri.:.;r· tlH' 
·levy or collPetion of any tax on or from tlw United 
States or any instrunwntalit)· tlwn·of, or the levy 
or collection of any tax with rP~pcct to t:lalu, pur-
chase, storage, or nse of tangible personal prop-
erty sold by the United StatPs or any in:-;trnmen-
tality tht>r€'of to any anthorizud purchaser. 
':Vith respect to sueh sales aB those hen; involved, 
the United States ha::-; not waived thP immunity of :-;ueh 
transaction~ from eHher sales or u~e taxation, but has 
expressly asserted that immunity. The tax lwre a~sessed 
is thereforP void under the I<,edPral Constitution, Artiele 
(i, Clm!Sl' 2 as an nttPmpt to intl·rl"Pre with :-wven·ignt~ 
\\'itlwut eonst>nt of tl!(' TTniterl8tatp:~. 
3. The Deficiency U::oe Tax t\s~;;;,essrnent Is Void, Be~ 
cause If Any Tax Was A.ppHcable It Would Be The Sales Tax. 
Here the property involved at all times was located 
in Utah, where plaintiff took po~::oession. (Stip. par. 1:~. 
R. 12.) ln such eas(~s tht> Commi~~ion itself ha~ eonsi~t­
Putly rnlr~d that it i~ fhP SniPs Tax and not HIP lT::;p Tax 
that applir>:-;. ( F~x. I, H.Pg. 4, R. 11 :1.) 
Wlt<'n taxahi<' JWn;onal property is located 
wi!l1in Uw :-;tat<• of Utah at the time of' sale and 
i:-; dc~liven~d \Yithin the stat<> of Utah, :,;uch sale 
is 1axahlc (under tlte Sales 'I'ax Act) irrespective 
of w/u'rc fl,,,~ parties to the cont.ract of sale are 
foca!cd and u-l1ere the contract u•as made or ac-
r·rtJ!rrl ur t/1(' jmlfls 11aid. 
This eonc;Lnwtion has rceeived tlw suppport of this 
c·ourl in ::ueh easPs as Union Portland Cement Co. v. 
~tate Tax ( ~ommission, 170 P. 2d 164, and Whitmore 
Oxyg-en Co. v. Utnh ~tatp 'l'ax Commission, reeently dP-
~·idHl h:" tl1i:-; c·.omt, l!l(i 1'. 2d 97G. 
Tint:-; plaintiff :;uhmits that tlw Ust> 'l'ax applied here 
Is ''oid, for ii' any tnx is applieahl<~. it is the Sales Tax; 
<llld tlH• ! T:w Tax p;;pn·s:-dy c;X<'lllpts the transaction under 
~R(L l!i-1( a) whPn the E1ales Tax is applicable. 
\\-it.\. tlH· d<'i'c·rH!ant ( 'ollJlllis:-;ion ('hose to levy the 
1':-;(' '!'ax is a matb~r of :-;ppeulation. It may be that it 
felt tho SalPs Tax Aet too clearly exempted sales by the 
l<'ederal UovernmPnt. Perhaps the Commission hoped 
that tlw dec~ision of thi~ court in the Portland Cement 
ca~(' on rnhc•aring applying the oecasional sale exemption 
to the Usp Tax might he ovprlooked or overruled. Still 
the fad-" bring this t ransaetion under the Sales Tax if 
ind0ed any tax is due at all, for it was a Utah sale. Whit-
rnrlrp Oxyg(~n Company, snpra. 11 he only act that took 
phwP ont:-;id<> ol' thi~; :-;tatP was the exPcution of the con-
trnd hv thr• OnvPrnnwnt in \Va:-;hington. (R. :12.) 
·1. The Def"cndan~.'s AHcm:;l to Tax Alone this Tran-
s:•dir,n ir, Di·~cr:minatory and Therefore Void as in Violation 
of the Utah and Federal Constitutions. 
We have heretofore discussed fully and the record 
IS explicit with respect to the facts l:lhowing that the 
Commission is here acting against Geneva alone. (Ex. 
H, B.. 111.) When the Commission l:lo acted it was not 
by inadvertence; nor waR it a change of policy. Such 
transactions have alway::; been and continue to be treated 
by the Commission aR exempt :::;ince 19:33. (Stip. par. 27, 
R. 17.) The rea:::;on for the tax in thiR emw waR the 
thrice-rPpcate(l instruction to HtP CommisRion by Ute 
Attorney (hmeral, dealing only with the Geneva tran-
:::;action. ( lj~x. :l, R. 1 G8-1 (i:3, 202.) 
Utah':::; Const.itution Rays: 
All laws of a general nature shaH have uni-
form operation. (Art TT, ~ 24.) 
No person shall be deprived of" " " property, 
without due process of law. (Art. 11, ~ 27.) 
'l'he Federal Constitution by Uw Fourteenth Amend-
ment likewise prohibits Utah from denying plaintiff the 
equal protection of its laws, or depriving it of its prop-
erty without due proeess of law. 
Now, twenty months after the fact, and acting 
against Geneva alone, the CommiRsion seeks to extract 
the use tax. From the instanees suggested in ~xhibit H 
it is evident that the Commission is aeting againRt 
Geneva alone, for sinee 1 ~):3:3 it has f'Xempted such in-
eidental transfers of personal property whether the seller 
sellR one or· Reveral units; or dividf'R and sells to more 
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than one purchaser; or uses the services of a sales agent 
to assist in the disposal. In none of these cases, including 
U<cmeva, was the owner who sold in the "business" as 
such of making sales of the tangible personal property 
incidentally involved. 
This attempt to so discriminate is void. 
While the Commission now suggests that it may pro-
ceed against other war plant purchasers from R.F.C., 
the record is still plain that the Commission is dis-
criminating against plaintiff and may be as to such 
other buyers. Under such circumstances the action hy 
the Commission is still, we admit, improper and void. 
'l'hat there may be no doubt as to this discrimination 
against Oeneva, we quote from the reluctant testimony 
of Supervisor Paul M. Holt, of the Commission, at the 
hearing of May 28, 1948. When asked by Commission's 
<'Otmsel, who referred to the list of twenty to thirty busi-
ne~s sah~s contained in Exhibit H, what the present 
instructions from the Commission were with respect to 
the~w transaetions, Holt said that a month or so before 
this hearing Commissioner 'l'witchell, with the approval 
of Commis:sioner Brown, said that ''in the ordinary 
eonrse of our work down there, that we were to audit 
all businesses that were acquired from War Assets Cor-
poration or from Heeonstnwtion Finance Corporation." 
( p. 12) On eross <~xamination he then saicl that in addi-
tion to Oencva Uw Utah Oil Refining Company was now 
IH~ing extended the new tax treatment. (p. lfl) But it is 
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c·lcar that the administrative eonstmction of the Com-
mission still eonsidcn; such transaetions exempt unless 
perchance the seller happens to he either the \Var Assets 
Administration or the Heeonstruetion Finance Corpora-
tion. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it seems apparent to counsel that in 
his zeal of advocacy and clesire to sustain a tax on any 
possible grounds, the Attorney General has advised the 
Commission to overlook or ignore certain basic and ele-
mentary rules of statutory construction which, if fol-
lowed, lead clearly to the true intention of Utah's l<~gisla­
ture and :,;upport plaintiff':,; contentions. 
(Thi:,; i:,; apart from factual PITor:,; u:-;ed in argument 
m J1~xhihit il no longer possible und<>r the reeonl in this 
case.) 
a. Revenue laws are to be construed stl":ct-Iy against 
the Government and in favor of tbe hnpayer. 
The Attorney General has verbally denied that this 
JS the rule, but we would have thou,ght that it was an 
eliementary rule of construction. This for the reason that 
tax laws are intended to be plain to the average man so 
that he can both know and anticipate his tax obligations. 
Neither plaintiff nor any other citizen should he re-
quired to face such ex post facto anrl rle novo attempts 
to extort extra revenue, with liahi·lity uncertain or un-
expected until decision by this court. 
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Thu::; thi:::: court has said: 
The doctrine that taxing statute::; are, in case 
of doubt as to the intention of the legislature, to 
he construed strictly ngainst the taxing authority 
and in favor of thm:p on whom the tax i;.: levied, 
has bee>n well set out in tlw case of Helvering v. 
Stockholms ~F~nskilda Ban],, 29:~ U.S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 
50, 7!) L. Ed. 211. ~1ee, ah;o, Los Angeles & S.L.R. 
Co. v. Richards. il2 lTtah 1, 172 P. 4H; vV. F . 
. Jens(•n Candy Co. \'. State rl'ax Commission, 90 
Utah :35~), 61 P. 2d G2D, 107 A.L.R. 261: 25 R.C.L. 
Sec. :~07 at p. 1 O!J2: CoolPy on Taxation, Vol. 11, 
4th Eel. SPe. 5();) at p. 111:~. * * * (Norville v. State 
Tax Commission, 9R Ptah 170, 97 P. 2d 9:~7.) 
b. The canstruction g·iven these statutes by the 'J'-,u 
Commissbn charged with carrying out the administration 
of the tax acts should be given consideration as a gu:\de to 
determining what the legisl-ature :ntended. 
rrhis rulp was recently pxpressed in Washington 
County v. State rrax Commission, 1:3:3 P. 2d 564, 103 
Utah 73, where at page 5G8 the following quotations were 
eited with approval: 
"'It is a general rule that contemporaneous 
c~on;.:truction hy the department of government 
specially ople.u;ated to earry out a provision of the 
Constitution raises a strong presumption that 
such constrnetion, if uniform and long acqnisced 
in, rightly interprets tlw provision. * ,, " \Vhi1P 
snch construction is not eonclusive upon thP 
eonrts, it i~: entitled to the most respectful con-
sideration.' \Vel'ls Fargo & Co. v. Harrington, !14 
Mont. 2:3;-i, 1 (i!) P. 4():~, 4()(). 
'' · 'l'he eonst ruetion pi need on " "' • constitu-
tional provisions hy offiepr;.: * • • at or near the 
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time of the enaetment, which has been long ac-
quiesced in, is a just medium for their judicial 
interpretation.' Foot,e v. Town of Watonga, 37 
Okl. 43, 1:~0 P. !197, 598." 
And generally, sef' !10 Am .• Jur. 30!), "Statutes", 
See. 319. 
Again, in 194-G this court said in Ol~en Co. v. ::-ltate 
rl'ax Commission, HiS P. (2d) 324, 109 Utah ;)53: 
Where there is an ambiguity in the statui<· 
as to whether the latter does or does not <'OVPI" 
a particular matter, a pradi<·al <·onstruction of 
the :,;tatute shown to have he<•n th<~ aceepted eon-
Htruetion of thc agency charged witlt administer-
ing the matter::-; in question under the statutf' will 
he one factor which tltP <·oHrt may take into con-
::-;ideration as persuasive a:,; to tl1P meaning of the 
statute. Espeeially is thi:,; true where the agenc~·. 
m; in thi::-; ease, is one on whom the Legislature 
mu:,;t rely to advise it a:,; to the praetieal working 
out of the statutc and "·here praetieal appliration 
of the statute presents the agency with unique 
opportnnitiPs and eXJH~rienecs for diseovering 
<leficif'nriPH, inacrurarie:,; or improvement:-: in th<• 
statute. 
In this ease, Ulnti.t thP salr of Geneva took place, for 
more than fifteen years the '1'ax ( 'ommission had treated 
such sales of integrated husinesse::-; as exempt. Now the 
Attorney Oeneral would i~nore all this. 
c. In construing a statute t':tc court should consider 
I he consequences involving oddities or unfairness which 
might follow from on~ construction and can be avoided by 
another construction. 
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This rule, quoted from Local Healty Co. v. Steele, 
G2 P. 2d 5!)8, 90 Utah 468, assumes that the statutory 
languagp is suseeptihlP of construction. If the legislative 
intent is otherwise clear thP wisdom or unwisdom, eon-
vemencP or ineonveniencP, or eonfusion or nneertainty 
rPtmlting is of <•.oursp not HlP eoneern of the court. 50 
Am . .Jur. ~~ ;~~0, :~8:~. ThPre is no place for either judicial 
or administrative eonstruetion. New Park Mining Co. 
et al v. StatP 'Pax Connnission, -~- Utah--, 196 P. 
2d 4f(i. 
HPn>, if indet>d doubt <'Xi~ts, should tiH· <~onstnwtion 
urged h~· HlP Comtnission tw adoptPd: 
1. Plaintiff, tog<•th<>r with other pnrehasers of busi-
nessPs from R.F'.C. and others, will face an unforeseen 
and ex pm;;t faeto tax liability now being or to he im-
posed for the fir:,;t tin~t• aftPr fifte<•n ypars' administra-
tion of the lTtah Sa!Ps-U:,;e Tax Ads. 
2. The Commi:,;sion will face the administrative 
task of ferreting out each :,;ueh purcha:;;e, in contrast to 
the praeticablP administrative procedure heretofore fol-
lowpd whereby it <·.an check sales from licensed or regiii-
tered retailers, and purchaspr:,; ean anticipate tax liabili-
ty when dealing with such vendors. 
:~. '!'he pn•sent :,;tatp polie:"· of eneouraging new in-
dustriPs will hp set at naugh1. 'I'll<• state of Utah wiH he in 
tht• anomalPns position of takiug offieial aetion through 
it:,; Oovprnor aud oth<'rs on the> onp hand to encourage 
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business in this state, wd<~oming Kai::;er-Ij'razler, ~imp­
lot ami. others; and with tilt:• other hand ex post t'aeto 
sending ''greetings" through it::; State 'l'ax Co1nmission. 
4. 'l.'lH• <~ourt must determiue the further problems 
ot' discrimination, int<•rfPreiH'P with federai govenlmPntal 
functions, and whetlwr th0 Salt's or Us<> 'l'ax applit•s. 
So plainhff ~:uhmits that for the l'on•r.!,'oing reasons 
the adion of the Commission should ht> ht>ld to hP \'oid 
and its deficiPne~· (l ::;p Tax a::;sPssment should hP st't 
aside. 'l'hPre has hePn herp no "saiP" of '' tanp;ih!P fH-'1'-
sonal property" at all within thP nwaning of th<• tax 
statutes; no ''retail sale'' h~· a "r<>tailPr" was involvPd. 
hut only an isolated oeem>ionnl trnn::;adion; governmPnt 
salt's are pxempt both by !Ttah s!;1tutps and by prineiplPs 
of eonstitutional law; tl!P applic):ti<:~l ol' th<' tax herp is 
void as disniminator~ and not dn<> proePss: and if any 
tax is dut> at all. it :,lJonld havP hP1·n thP ~alp~; Tax. 
'rh<>rp being :-;nhst:>ntial rp!r>;.:tion wit!t rPspeet to 
the::;p eontentioits, the;":• douh s :chould hP :·N;olvf'd tn 
favor of plaintiff aud ao,·ainst thP tnx eolledors; an<l the 
ConunisRion Rhould lw :tdvi:-;<>d that in (•n::p;; '''lH·n· aftN 
dne <'onsidPration sueh doubts p:-;ist, hereal'tPr it should 
n•Rolve :,;ueh doubts in favor of thP taxpay<·r until 1l1P 
h~gislaturP darifi0s tl10 taxing statutes. 'l'hP ( ~Ullllllis:.:ion 
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should continue to make its reports to tlle Governor and 
Legislature as required by §80-3-46 ( 20), and not take the 
law into its own hands. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PARSONS, 
\V:M. M. 1\IcCRF_jA, 
A. D. MO:B'F A'l', 
----------
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Atto.rneys for Plaintift. 
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